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ABSTRACT 
A new, fully IP-centric approach for connecting mission operations to spacecraft is presented in this paper. This 
topology provides for standard IP interfaces to be used for payload and flight components. This allows quick 
integration and easy reusability of satellite components, specifically lending itself to small satellites and accelerated 
mission deployments. From a mission operations point of view, satellite payload components and mission operations 
elements become IP end-points in a network. Ground stations become analogous to IP traffic forwarding, routing, 
and switching elements. The architecture provides an abstraction to the physical communication channels, routing 
communication packets over the internet, through ground stations, and onward to spacecraft.  Security is supported 
via IP encryption and decryption devices located in the mission operations center. All command messages, including 
mission operations commands, as well as payload retransmit requests messages, are encrypted away from the site, 
eliminating the need for key exchange protocols and security concerns at remote sites. A real-world demonstration 
of this architecture is performed using an existing network of ground stations and on-orbit spacecraft. From a single 
mission operations center, these spacecraft have been controlled/flown using a fully network centric approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many traditional LEO satellite communication systems 
utilize distinct and customized protocols to provide the 
connection amongst satellites, ground stations, and 
mission operations centers.  These protocols and 
communications networks are often inflexible and do 
not lend themselves to scalable and reusable 
architectures. In recent years, some satellite 
manufactures have moved to a more open approach 
whereby the satellites becoming flying IP endpoints.  
This creates a model whereby more widespread 
networking techniques may be employed to 
communicate with these spacecraft. 
SPACECRAFT 
The spacecraft currently operated (and to be operated in 
the future), are constructed using network-enabled 
components connected via industrial-grade switching.  
This technique has been proven to be capable of LEO 
operations with many of these spacecraft flying for 
years, demonstrating the applicability of such 
technology.  The spacecraft themselves can have a 
variable number of these IP-enabled components 
onboard, including an on-board computer (OBC) or a 
high data-rate recorder (HDR).  Several examples of 
spacecraft such as these are built by Surrey Satellite 
(SSTL).  These include the TripleSat constellation, 
Faraday test satellites, and Carbonite series of 
spacecraft.  Some of which are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Examples of IP-based Spacecraft 
It should be noted that the onboard devices are 
connected to the spacecraft bus via IP, not proprietary 
hardware connections.  In this way, the IP traffic is not 
tightly coupled with a physical layer, as in many 
spacecraft.  For example, it is possible to send telemetry 
traffic from the OBC computer over either S-band or X-
band downlinks to the ground.  This dissociation 
between the traditional physical and higher layers 
provides a level of flexibility and redundancy for many 
functions of the spacecraft. 
CURRENT GROUND ARCHITECTURE 
The current architecture employed by the existing 
satellite operators consists of two main elements: 
• Ground Station (Antenna) 
• Mission Operation Center (MOC). 
Currently, the ground station antenna and the MOC are 
almost always collocated, usually due to technological 
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limitations.  This creates a one-to-one relationship 
between a MOC, which flies the spacecraft and the 
ground station.  This architecture is depicted below in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Single Satellite, Single Ground Station 
The MOC contains the command/telemetry computers, 
encryption devices, and other typical Operation Center 
components. 
MULTI-SITE & MULTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM 
Moving away from an architecture whereby a single 
MOC is connected to a single ground station and 
operates with a single satellite is obviously useful.  The 
major uses of such a system are to: 
• Provide greater flexibility and availability in 
the execution of existing missions by enabling 
a wider range of ground station assets to be 
utilized. 
• Enable large constellation missions with 
multiple satellites which require many minutes 
over many ground stations, all operated by a 
single MOC. 
These requirements drive a separation of the various 
components as can be seen in Figure 3.  A single MOC 
is able to reach several satellites via a network of 
ground stations, presumably located throughout the 
world.  
 
Figure 3: Multi Satellite, Multi-Ground Station 
Per the diagram, this architecture incorporates a new 
element, the Internet, into the design.  This enabling 
element also creates challenges which are explored in 
the later sections. 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Security is always an important topic when considering 
the design of a satellite communications network.  
Satellites typically provide encryption for the over-the-
air portion, in order to provide an authentication 
mechanism for commanding as well as provide 
protection of the downlinked information.  In the 
existing architecture, a single MOC would contain the 
security appliance to provide this encryption.  The 
colocation of the encryption appliance inside the MOC 
provides the physical security that one would desire. 
In order to enable a large and distributed ground station 
network, it is still desirable to maintain the physical 
colocation of the security appliance in the MOC.  
Placing the encryption device at a potentially 
untrustworthy ground station location creates 
undesirable security vulnerabilities.  In addition, it 
creates the need for a key exchange mechanism with 
several remote sites.  Therefore, a major system design 
requirement is for the encryption device to remain at 
the centralized MOC.  This provides the same level of 
protection for the terrestrial portion as the over-the-air 
portion.  In addition, the IP-based design of the 
spacecraft was fully exploited by utilizing standard 
IPSEC tunneling as the encryption mechanism. 
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COMMUNICATION STACK 
The communication stack for the existing design with a 
collocated MOC and Ground Station is seen below in 
Figure 4. 
Moving through the stack, the Operations Computer 
generates commands and processes telemetry.  These 
messages are not encrypted and sent to/from the router.  
The router provides both IPSEC encryption/decryption 
as well as link-layer (OSI layer 2) processing.  The 
router is then connected, via a proprietary physical 
connection to the modem for physical layer processing.  
From the modem, the signal is provided to/from the 
antenna for communication with the satellite. 
 
Figure 4: Original Communication Stack 
There are several issues to overcome in this design if it 
is to be decentralized and distributed.  The IPSEC 
security appliance needs to remain at the MOC.  At the 
same time, the non-Ethernet based connection between 
the router and modem presents a problem with moving 
the modem.  Therefore, it was decided to incorporate 
link-layer functionality into the modem and have the 
router only perform IPSEC encryption.  The redesigned 
communication stack can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: New Communication Stack 
The interface type on the boundaries between the MOC 
and Ground Station is now at the IP layer, which is a 
necessity in order to make use of the Internet.   
The incorporation of the link-layer processing into the 
modem was accomplished fairly straightforwardly 
using modern software-defined radios (SDRs).  This 
was able to be fully implemented and tested. 
NETWORKING 
Network Connectivity 
One requirement of the design of the system was to be 
able to communicate with existing spacecraft without 
on-orbit reconfiguration.  This would allow them to 
continue operating with existing, traditional ground 
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segments, as well as operated with the new 
networked/centralized model. 
One of the main network configuration limitations is 
that the spacecraft devices all have IP addresses in the 
192.168.1.0/23 subnet.  The addresses in this subnet are 
meant for use on local networks only and are not 
Internet-addressable.  Now that the traffic is required to 
transit the Internet to communicate with the MOC, it is 
necessary to somehow encapsulate this traffic and join 
multiple locally addressed networks together. 
To solve this problem, the multi-point generic routing 
encapsulation (mGRE) protocol was employed.  This 
created a tunnel between the various ground stations 
and the MOC whereby 192.168.x.x traffic could freely 
flow and be routed between network elements.  The 
mGRE tunnel is shown below in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Multi-point Tunneling 
The mGRE tunnel was fairly simple to setup as well as 
adaptable to future ground stations.  A new ground 
station can be added as a new endpoints of the tunnel. 
Multi-Satellite Routing 
In addition to just network connectivity from MOC to 
ground stations, the traffic must also be routed to the 
correct spacecraft. With multiple LEO spacecraft and 
multiple sites, the command data generated at the MOC 
must be sent to the ground station only during the 
duration of the LEO pass.  This creates a temporally 
dynamic nature to the problem. Considering the 
spacecraft are not actually connected via a true 
IP/Ethernet network, the ground stations must provide 
some “spoofing” to the same effect. 
In order to accomplish this, before the pass the ground 
station advertises the routes for the upcoming 
spacecraft endpoints using open shortest path first 
(OSPF) routing protocol.  At the end of the pass, the 
routes are removed.  This allows the spacecraft to 
“appear” at different ground stations at different times 
and get command packets routed to them.  The OSPF 
routing protocol traverses the mGRE tunnel back to the 
MOC to provide the required routes.  This also had the 
positive effect that no changes to the mission operations 
software were required. 
SUMMARY AND TESTING 
The described network was implemented using several 
worldwide Viasat ground stations as well as a MOC at 
the SSTL headquarters in Guildford, UK.  Several 
spacecraft were successfully communicated with, both 
in S-band and X-band, including the Carbonite-1, 
shown below in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Carbonite-1 Spacecraft 
Overall, the project was a technical success and has 
created new operational capabilities for the participants 
involved.  To date, hundreds of passes have been taken 
using this technology.   
Acknowledgments 
Viasat would like thank the team at Surrey Satellite 
(SSTL) for their dedication and assistance in making 
this architecture a reality. 
